A Cross-Linguistic Perspective on the Expression of Manner by Arregui, Ana & Matthewson, Lisa
A Cross-Linguistic Perspective on the Expression of Manner 
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The goal of this paper is to investigate the expression of manner from a cross­
linguistic perspective. Our main concern is to investigate whether cross­
linguistic evidence supports an analysis of all manner adverbials as predicates 
over events. We will approach this question by investigating the expression of 
manner in St'at' imcets (Lillooet Salish), a language unrelated to English. 
Davidson (1967) has proposed an analysis of locative and temporal 
modifiers as predicates over an implicit event argument. An example is given in 
(1): 
(1) a Mary danced in the kitchen at midnight. 
b. ::Je [dancing(Mary, e) & in (the kitchen, e) & at (midnight, e)] 
Subsequent researchers (a.o .  Parsons 1990, Rothstein 1998) have argued that 
Davidson' s proposal should be extended to manner adverbs such as slowly, 
dangerously, or sadly. An example of Parsons' proposal is given in (2) (the 
manner adverb is treated as a one-place predicate over events, and the agent is 
introduced by means of a thematic-role predicate) : 
(2) a. Mary danced slowly / sadly in the kitchen at midnight. 
b. ::Je [dancing(e) & agent (Mary, e) & slow (e) / sad (e) & in (the 
kitchen, e) & at (midnight, e)] 
However, the claim that all manner adverbials are predicates over 
events is not uncontroversial. Geuder (2000), for example, has argued that 
psychological manner adverbials, such as sadly, have readings that involve 
predication over ordinary individuals instead of events. In this paper we will 
bring cross-linguistic evidence to bear on this issue. 
We will first propose an analysis of manner constructions in 
St'at' imcets. St' at' imcets is a language that allows locative and temporal 
modifiers to predicate over events but does not have manner adverbs similar to 
the English ones. The expression of manner in St' at' imcets is achieved using 
either subordinate temporal clauses or nominalized constructions. We will 
propose an analysis of these two strategies couched in the framework of 
situation semantics [Kratzer 1989]. We will also provide an explanation of 
why St'at' imcets lacks adverbs similar to the English manner adverbs. We will 
then investigate the generality of an event-based analysis of manner adverbs. In 
particular, we will be concerned with psychological manner adverbs. We will 
show that in St'at' imcets psychological predicates cannot be predicated over 
events, but can only be predicated over individuals. We will then briefly 
explore the possibility that this is the case also in English. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the relevant 
St'at' imcets data and empirical generalizations. In Section 3 we present an 
analysis of St'at' imcets manner constructions, showing the difference between 
the two strategies available for expressing manner. In Section 4 we provide an 
account of why St'at' imcets lacks English-type adverbs. In Section 5 we 
discuss St 'at' imcets data that suggests that psychological predicates are not 
able to predicate over events, and discuss possible consequences for the 
analysis of English psychological adverbials. 
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2. The expression of manner in St'at'imcets 
St'at'imcets (Lillooet) is a Northern Interior Salish language spoken in the 
interior of British Columbia, Canada. It is endangered. All data presented here 
come from primary field work. 
2.1. The absence of manner adverbs 
St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs. By this we do not mean simply that 
St'at'imcets lacks a class of manner adverbs that are morphologically distinct 
from adjectives. Many languages may fail to overtly distinguish adverbs from 
adjectives, but still use adjectives in what we would classify as an adverbial 
construction. A German example is given below: 
(3) a das Auto ist langsam 
the car is slow 
'The car is slow.' 
b. Susi fabrt langsam 
Susi drives slow 
'Susi drives slowly.' 
St'at'imcets differs from English in a more fundamental way: there are 
no constructions parallel to the English manner adverb construction. The 
examples in (4) show that it is not possible to use adjectives inside a VP to 
modify the description of an event 
(4) a. *tqaIk'-em k'fuk'ent kw-s Mary 
drive-INTR dangerous DET-NOM Mary 
'Mary drove dangerously.' 
b. *uxwal' -lhkan skenkln 
go.home-lsG.sUBJ slow 
'I went home slowly.' 
The example in (5) shows that the determiner ku, which functions as a 'linker' 
inside various modification structures (see Matthewson 1998), is actually 
unable to license adjectives appearing inside VP. 
(5) *tqaIk'-em ku k'fuk'ent kw-s Mary 
drive-INTR DET dangerous DET-NOM Mary 
'Mary drove dangerously.' 
In this section we have shown that St'at'imcets has no way of 
expressing manner by means of a single lexical item inside a VP. In the next 
section we will discuss the strategies that are available in St'at'imcets. 
2.2. Two strategies for the expression of manner 
St'at'imcets makes available two strategies for expressing manner. The first 
involves predication over individuals plus a subordinate temporal clause 
similar to an English when-clause. Examples of this construction are given 
below: 
(6) a. k'fuk'ent s-Mary [i tqaIk'-em-as] 
dangerous NOM-Mary [when. PAST drive-INTR-3cONJ] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'M. was dangerous when she drove') 
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b. pvmp-kan [i q'ilhil-an ati7] 
fast-lsG.SUBJ [when. PAST run-lSG.CONJ DElC] 
'I ran quickly.' (= 'I was fast when I ran.') 
The main clause in (6a) asserts that Mary was dangerous at some past time, 
and the subordinate temporal clause restricts that time to a driving time. 
Similarly, the main clause in (6b) asserts that I was fast at some past time, and 
the subordinate clause restricts that time to a time at which I was running. 
Both examples in (6) have temporal clauses headed by the temporal 
complementizer i. The presence of this complementizer restricts the temporal 
location of the events picked out by the subordinate clause to past times. 
St'at'imcets does have another complementizer, lh, which is not restricted to 
past times. However, for reasons of space, we will limit our attention in this 
paper to examples with i. 
The second strategy available for expressing manner in St'at'imcets 
involves the nominalization of a clause. A nominalized clause is headed by a 
determiner ti-a (dialectal variant ta-a), and the clausal sister to the determiner 
is headed by a nominalizer s-. The sister to s- is a fully inflected clause. 
Examples of this construction are given below: 
(7) a. k'ink'ent [ti s-tqaIk'-em-s-a s-Mary] 
dangerous [DET NOM-drive-JNTR-3sG.POSS-DET NOM-Mary] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'Mary's driving was dangerous.') 
b. skenkin [ti n-s-xat' -em-a ta sqwem-a] 
slow [DET lSG.POSS-NoM-hard-INTR-DETDET mountain-DET] 
'I walked up the hill slowly.' 
(= 'My walking up the hill was slow.') 
In (7a), k'{nk'ent 'dangerous' is predicated of a nominalized clause headed by 
a determiner ti-a. Similarly, in (7b) skenkfn 'slow' is predicated of a 
nominalized clause headed by ti-a. Two things are worth pointing out at this 
stage, since we will return to them later. One is that the predicates that we find 
in (7) can also predicate over ordinary individuals: 
(8) k'fuk'ent s-Mary 
dangerous NOM-Mary 
'Mary is/was dangerous.' 
The other is that the determiners that head the nominalized clauses are not 
specific to this construction. They are ordinary determiners that can combine 
with noun predicates: 
(9) xwesxwis-ana7 ti smulhats-a 
smile(REDup)-ear DET woman-DET 
'The woman smiled.' 
Ideally, an analysis of (7) should not require making special stipulations about 
either the predicates or determiners when they appear in this construction. This 
will be one of the goals of our analysis. 
The examples in (10) are presented to show that predication over 
nominalized clauses does not involve predication over the ordinary individuals 
that participate in the events: 
(10) a gelgel [t-s-tup-un' -as-a s-Bill s-Philomena] 
strong [DET-NOM-punch-TR-3ERG-DET NOM-Bill NOM-Philomena] 
'Philomena hit Bill hard.' (= 'P.' s punching of Bill was strong.') 
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b. lil' q [ta s-xat' -em-s-a ta sqwem-a 
easy [DET NOM-climb-INTR-3so.POSS-DET DET mountain-DET 
s-Philomena] 
NOM-Philomena] 
'Philomena climbed the mountain easily.' 
(= 'Philomena's climbing of the mountain was easy.') 
The sentence in (lOa) does not assert that Philomena was strong, only that her 
punching was strong. Similarly, (lOb) does not claim that Philomena was easy, 
only that she climbed easily. 
3. Analysis of the St'at'imcets manner constructions 
In this section we will present an analysis of the two constructions employed 
to express manner in St'at'imcets. 
3.1. Preliminary assumptions 
Our analysis of St'at'imcets manner constructions is formulated within the 
framework of Kratzer's (1989) situation semantics. That framework allows us 
to explain the relation between the interpretation of simple clauses and the 
interpretation of nominalized clauses in a simple and straightforward manner. 
Our analysis of nominalized clauses is partly inspired by Zucchi's (1993) 
proposal for the semantics of nominalized clauses in English, which is also 
stated within the framework of situation semantics. 
Kratzer (1989) proposes a semantic analysis of counterfactual 
conditionals based on situations. In this paper we will adopt the basic 
assumptions of that framework. Kratzer distinguishes between two kinds of 
possible individuals: ordinary individuals and situations. The members of both 
sets of individuals are partially ordered with respect to each other by means of 
a part-of relation. The intuition behind the part-of relation between situations 
is that a situation bears the relation to any other situation that, in an intuitive 
sense, contains it. Some situations are considered maximal: they are not proper 
parts of any other situation. Entities that are maximal with respect to the part­
of relation correspond to what is traditionally thought of as possible worlds. 
The set of possible worlds therefore, is a subset of the set of possible 
situations. 
In giving a semantic analysis in terms of situations, we will make use 
of the elements below: 
(11) a set of possible situations S (corresponding to the semantic type s) 
a set of possible individuals I (corresponding to the semantic type e) 
a partial ordering on the set of situations and individuals � 
the set of maximal elements with respect to the ordering relation, or the 
set of possible worlds 
Sentences will be taken to denote propositions. In the framework developed by 
Kratzer, propositions are sets of possible situations. So in addition to the 
elements in (11), we will make use of the power set of S (the set of 
propositions ). 
The proposal presented here diverges both from Kratzer's analysis of 
counterfactuals and from Zucchi's analysis of nominalizations in that, in 
addition to situations, we will make use of events. We will take events to be a 
subset of the set of individuals (i.e. a subset of I). We will assume that an 
event takes place in a situation iff it is part of that situation. An example is 
given in (12): 
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(12) drive (e)(Mary)(s) = 1 iff e is an event of Mary driving and e�s 
Our proposal differs from proposals in the literature that try to reconstruct the 
_ notion of event in terms of a primitive notion of situation (e.g. events as 
minimal situations with certain properties). We will not take a position in the 
debate as to how events should be defmed in terms of situations. As has often 
been noted, it is notoriously difficult to spell out the individuation conditions 
on events, and we will set aside this problem here. We will simply treat events 
as a kind of individual. Further work could allow for a refinement of this 
proposal. 
In dealing with the semantics of St'at'imcets nominalized clauses it 
will be necessary to spell out the semantics of aspect and tense. To do so we 
will appeal to a function 't mapping events to their running times. So, in 
addition to the set of situations and the set of individuals, we will include as an 
ingredient in our semantics the set of times T (corresponding to the semantic 
type i). Depending on the view adopted with respect to the nature of time, the 
members of T will or will not be defmable in terms of situations or events. We 
will remain neutral on this point. 
Following Partee (1973) and Kratzer (1998a), we adopt a referential 
analysis of tense. Tenses are taken to be referential expressions, similar to 
pronouns. They refer to individuals in the domain of times (T). Following 
Kratzer (1998a), we will assume that aspectual heads map properties of events 
onto properties of times. Tenses c-command aspectual heads and saturate the 
time argument corresponding to properties of times, mapping properties of 
times onto propositions. 
St'at'imcets has overt tense and aspect morphology, but such 
morphology is optional. We will assume that phonologically null tense and 
aspect heads are present even in cases in which they are not overtly indicated. 
We will also assume that the default value for aspect is perfective. Evidence 
supporting this claim comes from aspectual restrictions on present tense 
interpretations. In St'at'imcets, as in English, only stative eventualities can 
receive an 'ongoing event' interpretation in the present tense. Bennett and 
Partee (1978) have argued, with respect to English, that such aspectual 
restrictions are due to the fact that only stative eventualities (i.e. homogeneous 
eventualities) can 'fit' within the instantaneous speech time. Their underlying 
assumption, with respect to English, is that the time of the event must be 
included within the interval specified by tense. We will incorporate Bennett 
and Partee's insight about English into our analysis of St'at'imcets by 
proposing that the default value for aspect is perfective: a perfective operator 
requires that the running time of the eventuality be included within the 
temporal interval denoted by tense. In this way we can derive the aspectual 
restrictions on present tense interpretations. 1 
We will adopt the analysis of aspect and tense presented in Kratzer 
(1998a). According to that proposal, aspectual heads map properties of events 
onto properties of times (the interpretation of perfective aspect is given in 
(13a» . Tenses come in two varieties: deictic and variable tenses (the 
interpretation of the deictic tenses in St'at'imcets is given in (13b-d), while the 
interpretation of a phonologically null variable tense is given in (13e» . 
Variable tenses differ crucially from deictic tenses in that variable tenses can 
be bound while deictic tenses cannot. The reader is referred to Kratzer (1998a) 
for discussion and motivation of this proposal. 
(13) a. [[0perfective]] = AP <e, <S, t» At As 3e [ P(e)(s) & 't (e) c t] 
b. [[tu7]] = a contextually salient past time (abbreviated with tpast) 
c. [[0pastl] = a contextually salient past time (abbreviated with tpast) 
d. [[0presentl] =a contextually salient present time (abbreviated ipres> 
e. [[0illg = g(i) = � 
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Given the assumptions spelled out so far, the LF and interpretation of a 
simple tensed clause (14a) would be as in (14b) and (14c): 
(14) a tqaIk' -em tu7 s-mary 
drive-INTR PAST NOM-Mary 
'Mary drove' 
b. LF 
TP 
� 
tense �P 
tn7 (past) � � 
aspect VoiceP 
0perfedive � 
s-Mary VP 
� 
tq8lk'-em 
drive-INTR 
c. [[TP]] = A.s3e[drive(e)(s) & agent(Mary)(e)(s) & 'tee) c !pastl 
3.2. Subordinate temporal clauses (i-clauses) 
As we have seen in Section 2.2, subordinate temporal clauses are one of the 
strategies available for the expression of manner in St'at'imcets. The example 
in (6a) is repeated below: 
(15) k'fuk'ent s-Mary [i tqaIk'-em-as] 
dangerous NOM-Mary [when. PAST drive-INTR-3cONJ] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'Mary was dangerous when she drove') 
We will propose an analysis according to which i binds a temporal 
variable introduced by tense in the subordinate clause (this analysis predicts 
that tenses in i-clauses are always variable tenses). As mentioned before, the 
complementizer i indicates that the subordinate clause denotes a property 
predicated of past times. This restriction to past times will be captured as a 
presupposition introduced by i. The interpretation of i is given below: 
(16) [[i]] = A.P <i, <s, t» A.t: t is past [pet)] 
Given this proposal, the LF and interpretation of a sentence like (15) will be as 
in (17): 
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(17) a. 
TP 
At:t is past.A.s3e[drive(e)(s)&agent(Mary)(e)(s) 
AspP 
� 
aspect VoiceP 
0perfedive 
k'ink'ent s-Mary 
dangerous NOM-Mary 
& 't(e) c t] 
as ect 
0perfedive � 
tqruk' -em-as 
drive-INTR-3 CON] 
b. AS 3e 3e' [ dangerous (e)(s) & agent(Mary)(e)(s) & 't(e) c �ast & 
drive (e')(s) & agent (Mary)(e')(s) & 't(e') c �st ] 
The i-clause is interpreted by intersection with the main clause (see Heim and 
Kratzer's 1998 Predicate Modification Rule). The result is a property of times 
that contain both events of Mary driving and events of Mary being dangerous. 
The tense pronoun in TP saturates the temporal argument of this property, 
resulting in a proposition that corresponds to the set of situations that contain 
both a past event of Mary driving and a past event of Mary being dangerous. 
The temporal location of such events is restricted to some contextually salient 
past time. 
According to the analysis proposed here, it is Mary who is asserted to 
be dangerous, not her driving. Driving in a dangerous manner is certainly one 
of the ways in which Mary could be dangerous while driving, but it is not the 
only one. It could be the case that Mary was driving quite cautiously, but was 
dangerous while driving due to some completely independent factor (e.g. she 
likes to shoot out of the window while she is driving, and sometimes she hits 
animals or people). The sentence in (15) can be truthfully uttered in such 
circumstances, as our analysis predicts. 
3.3. Nominalized clauses 
3.3.1. The internal structure oJnominalized clauses 
As we have seen in Section 2.2, the second strategy available in St'at'imcets 
to express manner involves the use of nominalized clauses. Example (7a) is 
repeated below: 
(18) k'fnk'ent [ti s-tqaIk'-em-s-a s-Mary] 
dangerous [DET NOM-drive-INTR-3so.POSS-DET NOM-Mary] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'Mary's driving was dangerous.') 
St'at'imcets nominalized constructions do not correspond directly to English 
gerund constructions (nominalized clauses in English). The St'at'imcets 
nominalized predicate does not behave like a noun with respect to any of the 
diagnostics for noun-hood in the language. Moreover, St'at'imcets 
nominalized clauses allow for the overt presence of both tense and aspect 
morphology. Examples are given below: 
7 
8 Ana Arregui and Lisa Matthewson 
(19) a skenkfn [ta s-xat' -em-s-a to7 s-Mary] 
slow· [DET NOM-climb-INTR-3sG.POSS-DET PAST NOM-Mary] 
'Mary climbed slowly.' 
b. ama [t-s-wa7 nfk' -in-as s-Mary ta ts'uqwaz' -a] 
good [DET-NOM-PROG cut-TR-3ERG NOM-Mary DET fish-DET] 
'Mary was cutting the fish well.' 
As in the case of simple clauses, we will assume that tense and aspect heads 
are present even in the absence of overt morphology. 
The nominalized clause in examples like (18) will be assigned the 
internal structure in (20): 
(20) 
nom TP 
s- � tense AspP 
0past � 
aspect 
0perfedive 
s-Mary 
tqaIk' -em-s 
drive-INTR-3sG.poss 
Nominalized clauses in St'at'imcets embed a full TP, and TPs denote 
propositions. The TP in (20), for example, denotes the proposition specified in 
(21): ' 
(21) [[TP]]= A.s3e[drive(e)(s) & agent(Mary)(e)(s) & 't(e) C !past] 
Part of the challenge of giving an analysis of St'at'imcets nominalized clauses 
consists in explaining how the meaning of the proposition denoted by the TP 
contributes to the overall interpretation. We will address this and related issues 
in the next section. 
3.3.2. Minimal situations in nominalized clauses 
An adequate analysis of St' at'imcets nominalized clauses should explain how 
the meaning of the entire construction is compositionally derived. This 
includes accounting both for the meaning contribution of the embedded TP, 
and for the meaning contribution of the ti-a determiner that heads the 
nominalized clause. As we have seen in (9) [repeated below], the determiners 
that head nominalized clause are ordinary determiners that appear in DPs in 
combination with noun predicates: 
(22) xwesxwfs-ana7 ti smulhats-a 
smile(REDup)-ear DET woman-DET 
'The woman smiled.' 
One goal of our analysis is to arrive at a uniform treatment of determiners that 
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can account for their interpretation in both constructions. 
Matthewson (1999) has investigated the semantics of determiners in 
combination with noun predicates. She has argued that ti-a determiners in 
St' at' imcets introduce a variable over choice functions, picking out an 
individual from the set corresponding to the predicate denoted by the noun 
[the reader is referred to Matthewson for details and discussion]. The 
determiner in (22), for example, denotes a contextually salient function that 
picks out one woman from the set of women, and the sentence then asserts that 
that woman smiled. Ignoring tense and aspect, a simplified representation of 
the meaning of (22) is given below: 
(23) smiled (f(woman» 
We will adopt Matthewson's choice-function analysis of determiners and 
extend it to the cases in which determiners appear in nominalized clauses. To 
do that we need to explain what the set is that the choice function is operating 
on in nominalized constructions. Inspired by Zucchi (1993), we would like to 
propose that nominalized clauses denote minimal situations. We will argue 
that the choice function determiner ti-a picks out a minimal situation from a 
set of minimal situations that is the denotation of the clause sister to the 
determiner, the clause headed by the nominalizer s-. 
We have proposed that the TP in (20) denotes a proposition: the set of 
situations that include an event of Mary driving with a running time included 
in some contextually salient past time (more specifically, the characteristic 
function of that set). The set corresponding to the proposition contains all 
situations that include such a driving event, both minimal and non-minimal (it 
will, for example, include the maximal situations that contain such an event, 
entire worlds). Clearly the choice function determiner does not operate on 
such a set (it cannot pick out an entire world). It operates on the subset of that 
set made up of minimal situations. We propose that the nominalizer s- is 
responsible for trimming away the non-minimal situations in the TP. s­
combines with a proposition and the result is the subset of minimal situations 
within that proposition. The interpretation we propose for s- is given below: 
(24) [[s]] = ",p <s t> As [pes) & \;;/s' [ [pes') & s' �s] � S'=S]2 
(abbreviated' as: ",PAs[P(S) & mines)]) [Heim 1990, von Fintel 1994] 
Given this semantics for s-, the denotation of the clause sister to the 
determiner in (20) will be as in (25): 
(25) [[s 0�ast 0perfective [VoiceP tqaIk'-ems sMary] ]] = As 3e [ drive(e)(s) & agent (Mary)(e)(s) & 'tee) c �ast & mines)] 
According to (25), the clause headed by s- denotes the set of minimal 
situations that contain an event of Mary driving. What do such situations look 
like? How are they made up? According to the definition in (24), minimal 
situations that contain a driving event by Mary will have no proper subparts 
that also contain that event. This is because they have no parts that are 
irrelevant to the event. In fact, the minimal situations that contain such events 
will tum out to be indistinguishable from the events themselves. When we talk 
about a minimal situation containing an event we are, in a sense, referring to 
one individual twice, once under the guise of an event, and once as a situation. 
Given this view of situations and events, the set of minimal situations 
containing certain events turns out to be identical to the set of events itself. 
Under the analysis proposed above, the clause headed by s- and the VP 
in (20) can both pick out a set of events in a world. They do not, however, pick 
out the same set. The VP picks out all the driving events. The clause headed 
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by s- picks out a subset of the driving events: it picks out those driving events 
that are events of driving by Mary that have a running time that is included in 
the contextually salient past time. 
Since the choice function determiner combines with a clause that 
denotes a set of minimal situations that contain an event of the relevant kind, it 
will, in fact, pick out one of those events. The denotation of the nominalized 
clause will then be a contextually salient event (Le. an event selected by a 
contextually salient choice function). In an example like (IS) the nominalized 
clause picks out a contextually salient eventlminimal situation of Mary 
driving, and the sentence then asserts that that event was dangerous. 
Matthewson notes that the choice function determiner ti-a carries 
existence entailments: DPs headed by ti-a refer to individuals that actually 
exist [Matthewson 1995, 1999]. There is a parallel in the domain of 
nominalized clauses, as nominalized clauses are factive and are taken to refer 
to events that have actually taken place. This could be captured if it were the 
case that the choice-function determiner can only pick out an actual-world 
minimal situation. Working out such restrictions, however, remains a matter 
for future research (cf. Zucchi, who also argues that nominalized clauses (in 
English) presuppose that an event of the relevant kind has occurred). 
3.3.3. Predicating over events 
According to the analysis spelled out above, clauses headed by the 
nominalizer s- denote (the characteristic functions of ) sets of situations that 
are also events. This means that such clauses are ambiguous as to their 
semantic type. Viewed as sets of situations, they would be classified as of type 
<s, t>. Viewed as sets of events, they would be classified as of type <e, t> 
(recall that events are a subset of the set of individuals). That is, clauses 
headed by s- can be characterized as denoting predicates of individuals. 
According to Matthewson, choice function determiners map such predicates 
onto a contextually salient individuaL The result is that a nominalized clause 
denotes an individual (type e). 
Given their semantic type, nominalized clauses can combine with 
predicates of individuals. We suggest that that is indeed what happens in 
examples like (IS). The predicate k'[nk'ent 'dangerous' can be predicated of 
ordinary individuals (as in (S), repeated as (26» , or of events (as in (IS), 
repeated as (27» : 
(26) k'fuk'ent s-Mary 
dangerous NOM-Mary 
'Mary is/was dangerous.' 
(27) k'fnk'ent [ti s-tqaIk' -em-s-a s-Mary] 
dangerous [DET NOM-drive-INTR-3so.POSS-DET NOM-Mary] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'Mary's driving was dangerous.') 
It is possible to capture the interpretation of k'[nk'ent (dangerous) in both 
cases by treating it as a predicate of individuals. In sentences like (27) it 
combines with a nominalized clause. The LF of (27) will be as in (2Sa), and its 
interpretation as in (2Sb): 
A CRoss-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EXPRESSION OF MANNER 
(28) a. 
TP 
� tense AspP 
0past � 
aspect PredP 
0perfedive /", 
k'ink'ent Y\. 
dangerous � 
[ti s-0past 0perfeetive tq8lk'-em-s-a s-Mary] 
(nominalized clause 'Mary's driving') 
b. AS 3e [dangerous (f (As'3e' [drive (e' )(s') & agent (Mary)(e')(s' ) & 
'tee') C !past & mines' )]])� (e)(s) & 'tee) C !pastl 
3.3.4. Summary 
In this section we have given an analysis of the semantics of St'at' imcets 
nominalized constructions. We have argued that in this construction a choice 
function determiner picks out a minimal situation from a set. Since such a 
situation will be extensionally equivalent to an event, nominalized clauses can 
be taken to denote contextually salient events. In the framework we have 
adopted, events are a kind of individual. Predicates that can predicate over 
individuals will also (sometimes) be able to predicate over events, and in this 
way a manner interpretation will be achieved. 
4. Why St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs 
Having provided an analysis of the St'at' imcets manner constructions, we now 
tum to the question of why St'at' imcets lacks constructions like the English 
manner adverb construction. As we discussed in Section 1, many researchers 
assume that the English construction involves predication over an event 
argument. An example is given below: 
(29) a.' Mary drove slowly! dangerously! sadly. 
b. 3e [driving (e) & agent (Mary, e) & � (e)! dant:erous(e)! � (e)] 
It could be thought that the reason that St'at' imcets lacks logical forms like 
(29b) is that it lacks an event argument altogether. We will show in the next 
section that such an explanation would be wrong and that there is evidence 
that St'at'imcets does have an event argument. 
4.1. Locative and temporal modifiers in St'at'imcets 
St'at' imcets possesses locative and temporal modifiers parallel to those 
originally used by Davidson to motivate an event analysis for English. 
Examples are given in (30): 
(30) a. k'wezus-em s-Mary I-ti lep'-c81-tn-a 
work- INTR NOM-Mary in-DET dig-INTR-INSTR-DET 
'Mary worked in the garden.' [locative modifier] 
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b. t'ak t'u? xelh Ihel-na Ihw3l'tsten-a t'anam'ten 
go just cold from-DET October-DET month 
'It's got cold since October.' [temporal modifier] 
Davidson argued that an event analysis is needed to straightforwardly 
capture the entailment relations holding between sentences containing 
modifiers of this type and sentences lacking them. An example of the 
entailment relations is given below [(32) is entailed by (31)]: 
(31) a. Mary danced in the bathroom. 
b. 3e [dancing (e) & agent (Mary, e) & in (the bathroom, e)] 
(32) a. Mary danced. 
b. 3e [dancing (e) & agent (Mary, e)] 
The entailment facts motivating Davidson's proposal are found also in 
St'at'imcets. The sentence in (30a), for example, entails the sentence in (33): 
(33) k'wezus-em s-Mary 
work-INTR NOM-Mary 
'Mary worked.' 
Given that the entailment facts are the same in St'at'imcets as in English, 
equal support for an event-based analysis of locative and temporal modifiers is 
to be found in both languages. Such an analysis is illustrated below for 
St'at'imcets, where (34) is the LF of (30a): 
(34) As 3e [ work (e)(s) & agent (Mary)(e)(s) 
& in (the garden)(e)(s) & 'C(e) c !pres] 
� 
tense AspP 
0put � 
VoiceP aspect 
0perfedive � 
s-Mary Ae As [work(e)(s) & in (the garden)(e)(s)] 
� 
Ae As [work(e)(s)] Ae As [in (the garden)(e)(s)] 
L � 
k'wez6s-em 
work-INTR 
l-ti lep'c3l'tn-a 
(locative) 
The data presented in this section suggest that the evidence for an implicit 
event argument is as good in St'at'imcets as in English. In principle nothing 
rules out predication over an implicit event argument in St'at'imcets. The 
difference between St'at'imcets and English with respect to manner adverb 
constructions must come from another source. 
4.2. The solution 
We propose that St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs because it lacks lexical 
items with the right argument-structure properties. Following Matthewson and 
A CRoss-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EXPRESSION OF MANNER 
Davis (1995), Davis (2000), we claim that St'at' imcets possesses only a two­
way distinction in lexical categories: nouns vs. everything else. The difference 
is that while nouns may appear in the syntax as bare predicates, without 
projecting to tense, non-nouns necessarily project clausal structure. 3 
Given the claim above, it follows. that a predicate like skenkfn 
'dangerous' will always appear with its own tense and external argument. It is 
impossible for a lexical item of this type to predicate directly over the event 
argument: a type mismatch would ensue. This is illustrated below: 
(35) a. *tqalk'-em k'fuk'ent kw-s Mary 
b. 
drive-INTR dangerous DET-NOM Mary 
'Mary drove dangerously.' 
tense 
0past 
aspect ./ 
0perfective 
Mary 
tqilk'-em 
drive-INTR 
tense 
0past 
aspect 
0perfective 
k'ink'ent 
dangerous 
There is a type mismatch at the VP1 node: VP2 is a property of events and TP2 
is a proposition. 
The explanation given here of the ungrammaticality of (35a) is similar 
to the explanation that would be given of the ungrammaticality of (36): 
(36) a *Mary drove was dangerous. 
b. *Mary drove scared me. 
In English, two verbs cannot predicate over the same event because each verb 
must have its own functional structure (i.e. it must project to Tense). The 
difference between St' at' imcets and English is that English has a separate 
category of Adjectives which do not have to project to Tense. 
The claim that the inability of verbs in English to function as adverbs 
is due to a tense requirement is found also in observations made by Rothstein 
(1983:148): 
There are no verbal adjuncts ... This systematic gap can be explained in 
the following way ... adjunct predicates are always uninflected. 
Prepositional adjectival and nominal heads are not morphologically 
inflected and therefore there is no problem with their being used as 
adjuncts. Verbs, unlike these other categories, have a morphological 
'slot' for inflection, and require an inflectional affix of some kind in 
order to be morphologically well formed. 
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The proposal made here also bears some similarity to claims made by 
Baker (in prep.). In his discussion of the defining properties of adjectives and 
verbs, Baker argues that 
only verbs have the power to take a specifier, which is normally theta­
marked as a theme or agent ... The distinctive property of a verb is that 
it has a theta role to discharge; if that theta role is not properly 
assigned, the structure will be ruled out by the (ordinary) theta 
criterion. 
While there are many differences in detail between Baker's analysis and ours, 
it seems that there is a common prediction to both: in a language which lacks a 
category of adjectives separate to verbs, adverbs will also be absent. 
4.3. A consequence for locative and temporal rrwdifiers 
The analysis presented above makes a prediction about locative and temporal 
modifiers in St'at'imcets. In Section 4.1 we analyzed such modifiers as event 
predicates inside the VP. Given our discussion in Section 4.2, the prediction is 
that such modifiers need not project Tense (otherwise they too would lead to a 
type mismatch). This prediction is upheld. The examples in (37) show that 
locative and temporal modifiers are unable to function as main predicates (in 
this they differ from all other XP categories such as AP, NP or VP): 
(37) a. *l-ta tsftcw-a kw-s Bucky 
in-DET house-DET DET-NOM Bucky 
'Bucky is in the house.' 
b. *pinlini7 ku sutik ta t'ep-a maqa7 
then DET winter DET deep-DET snow 
'The deep snow was that winter.' 
Sentences like (37a) become grammatical if a locative predicate wa7 'to be in 
a location' is added. In (38), wa7 functions as the main predicate of the 
sentence, and it takes the locative PP as one of its arguments: 
(38) wa7 l-ta tsftcw-a kw-s Bucky 
loc in-DET house-DET DET-NOM Bucky 
'Bucky is in the house.' 
Summarizing the results of this section, we have argued that o'nly lexical items 
that need not project their own clausal structure can be added as predicates of 
events within the VP. The absence of manner adverbs in St'at'imcets is due to 
the restricted categorial system of the language. 
5. Psychological adverbs 
As was mentioned in Section 1, objections have been raised to the claim that 
all manner adverbs are predicates over events. Geuder (2000), for example, 
has argued that psychological manner adverbs predicate over ordinary 
individuals in some interpretations. In this section we will discuss data from 
St'at'imcets that suggest that psychological manner adverbs actually never 
predicate over events, and then we will discuss the consequences of adopting 
this view for English. 
A CRoss-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EXPRESSION OF MANNER 
5.1. Psychological predicates in St'at'imcets 
According to the analysis proposed in Section 3, nominalized clauses in 
St'at'imcets denote a single salient event. In examples like (18) [repeated 
below], a nominalized clause functions as the subject of a predicate: the 
sentence asserts that Mary's driving was dangerous (see (28) above). 
(39) k'fnk'ent [ti s-tqaIk'-em-s-a s-Mary] 
dangerous [DET NOM-drive-INTR-3so.POSS-DET NOM-Mary] 
'Mary drove dangerously.' (= 'Mary's driving was dangerous.') 
Our conclusion was that with nominalized clause subjects, the predicate is 
predicated over the event denoted by the clause. In this way a 'manner' 
interpretation is obtained. 
Interestingly, not all predicates can combine with a nominalized 
clause. Some examples of ungrammatical attempts are given below: 
(40) a. *qlil [ta s-we7aw-s-a s-Mary] 
angry [DET NOM-holler-3so.POSS-DET NOM-Mary] 
'Mary shouted angrily.' (= 'Mary's shouting was angry.') 
Consultant's comment: "Bad. You're not saying who got mad because 
she hollered." 
b. *qwenuxw-alhts'a7 [ta s-matq-s-a kati7 s-Mary] 
sick-inside [DET NOM-walk-3so.POSS-DET DEIC NOM-M.] 
'Mary walked around sadly.' (= 'Mary's walking around was sad.') 
c. *kwezfn'cwem [ta nk'talus-mfn-ts-as-a s-Mary] 
jealous [DET (NoM)-stare-APPL-1so.0BJ-3ERO-DET NOM-M.] 
'Mary stared at me jealously.' (= 'M.'s staring at me was jealous.') 
The ungrammaticality of examples like (40) suggests that psychological 
manner adverbs do not predicate over events. We suggest that such predicates 
only predicate over ordinary individuals. This predicts that such predicates 
will be acceptable in subordinate i-clauses, and the prediction is borne out: 
(41) a qlil kw-s Mary [i we7aw-as] 
angry DET-NOM Mary [when.PAsT holler-3cONJ] 
'Mary shouted angrily.' (= 'Mary was angry when she shouted.') 
b. qwenuxw-alhts'a7 s-Mary [i matq-as kati7] 
sick-inside NOM-Mary [when. PAST walk-3CONJ DElC] 
'Mary walked around sadly.' 
(= 'Mary was sad when she walked around.') 
When consultants are asked to translate English sentences contammg 
depictives, the same subordinate clause construction is used, as illustrated in 
(42). This suggests that whatever the distinction is between English adverbial 
and depictive constructions, the distinction is neutralized in St'at'imcets : 
(42) qlil kw-s Philomena [i t'fq-as] 
angry DET-NOM Philomena [when.PAsT arrive-3CONJ] 
'Philomena arrived angry.' (= 'Po was angry when she arrived.') 
Having argued that psychological predicates in St'at'imcets always 
predicate over ordinary individuals, the prediction now is that it will be 
contradictory to deny that the relevant emotional state holds of the individual. 
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And this prediction is borne out: 
(43) * qli1 kw-s Mary [i w-as we7aw], t'u7 ay 
angry DET-NOMMary [when.PAST PROG-3cONJ holler but NEG 
t'u7 kw-s qli1 
just DET-NOM angry 
'Mary shouted angrily, but she wasn' t angry.' 
We claim that in St'at'imcets psychological state predicates are always 
predicated over ordinary individuals, and never over events. We will briefly 
investigate the consequences of a similar hypothesis for English in the next 
section. 
5.2. Subject depictives and psychological adverbs in English 
The contrast exemplified in (44) appears problematic for the claim that in 
English psychological predicates can only predicate over ordinary individuals, 
and not over events. 
(44) a. John left the room sad. 
b. John left the room sadly. 
A fully generalized event-predicate analysis of adverbs can easily capture the 
difference between (44a) and (44b) by claiming that the adverb, and not the 
depictive, predicates over the event argument, as illustrated in (45): 
(45) a. 3e [leave(e) & Theme(John, e) & sad(John)] 
b. 3e [leave(e) & Theme(John, e) & sad(e)] 
However, the availability of logical forms like (45b) in English makes it 
totally mysterious why psychological predicates cannot predicate over events 
in St'at' imcets nominalized clauses. We would like to suggest that (45) may 
not be the correct analysis of the contrast in (44). Instead, we would like to 
differentiate between sad and sadly in terms of evidentiality. We claim that 
both sad and sadly predicate over ordinary individuals. The difference is that 
sad asserts that an individual is actually sad, while sadly only asserts that an 
individual appears to be sad. A proposal along these lines would capture the 
contrast in (44), and would also be able to explain why examples like (46) are 
felicitous (and not contradictory): 
(46) a. John walked sadly off the stage, but he wasn't sad. 
b. Although Jan drove the car drunkenly, she wasn't drunk. 
c. Although Jan drove the car drunk, she didn't drive drunkenly. 
[(46c) is from D6chaine 1993] 
One obvious question raised by this proposal is how the evidential 
meaning we have assigned to -ly can be reconciled with the other non­
evidential uses of this suffix. Some examples are given in (47): 
(47) a. Fortunately / happily / luckily, it didn't rain. 
b. Frankly / honestly, I don't give a damn. 
We are not able to provide a thorough analysis of the -ly suffix in this paper. 
It could be the case that there is more than one -ly suffix in English. Or that 
-ly itself is semantically vacuous, and that in English evidentiality is expressed 
by means of a phonologically null morpheme. The topic remains a matter for 
future research. 
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5.3. Back to St'at'imcets: The evidential reading 
According to the proposal sketched in Section 5.2, adverbs like sadly are 
actually predicates over ordinary individuals. They differ from sad in terms of 
evidentiality, not in terms of argument structure. If the evidential sadly­
reading is obtained by predicating over ordinary individuals, we expect to find 
an equivalent reading in St' at'imcets. In this section we will discuss how that 
reading arises. 
St'at'imcets possesses a set of clitics which encode notions like 
'evidential', 'quotative', 'surmise'. These clitics are obligatory. If they are 
absent, the speaker is assumed to have direct knowledge of what is being 
reported. This is illustrated in (48): 
(48) a wa7 qwenuxw-alhts'a7 kw-s Harry 
PROO sick-inside DET-NOM Harry 
'Harry is sad.' 
b. wa7-as-an' qwenuxw-alhts'a7 kw-s Harry 
be-3eoNI-EVID sick-inside DET-NOM Harry 
'Harry seems sad.' 
The sentence in (48a) is judged to be appropriate only if the speaker really 
knows that Harry is sad (i.e., Harry must have told the speaker that he is sad). 
If it just looks like Harry is sad (e.g., he has a sad expression on his face), then 
(48a) is inappropriate, and an evidential construction such as in (48b) must be 
used. 
Examples like the ones in (48) suggest that the sadly -reading should 
be expressed in St'at'imcets using the evidential markers that are 
independently utilized in the language. The examples in (49) show that this is 
indeed the case. When consultants are asked to express that an action was 
performed in a sad manner, without the individual necessarily being sad, they 
volunteer the following overtly evidential constructions: 
(49) a qwenuxw-alhts'a7-as-a s-Mary [i wa7-as kati7 matq] 
sick-inside-3eoNI -DET NOM-M. [when PRoo-3CNI DEle walk] 
'Mary seemed sad when she was walking around.' 
b. qwenuxw-alhts'a7-as-a k'a [i w-as matq s-Jason] 
sick-inside-3eoNI-DET EVID [when PRoG-3eONJ walk NOM-J.] 
'Jason seemed sad when he was walking around.' 
6. Conclusion 
St'at'imcets is a language that lacks manner adverbs similar to the English 
ones. Two constructions are available to express manner: subordinate temporal 
clauses and nominalized clauses. In this paper we have proposed an analysis 
of these constructions, as well as an explanation of why St'at'imcets lacks 
English-type adverbs. 
Many researchers working within neo-Davidsonian frameworks have 
proposed to analyze manner adverbs as predicates over events. However, the 
generality of this treatment has been questioned in the literature. It has been 
suggested that psychological adverbs do not necessarily predicate over events. 
We have argued that in St'at'imcets psychological predicates actually never 
predicate over events. And we have suggested that this view could be adopted 
for English too. 
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Endnotes 
*We are very grateful to Beverley Frank, Gertrude Ned, Laura Thevarge and 
Rose Whitley for sharing their knowledge of St'at'imcets. We are also very 
grateful to Henry Davis for helping with data collection, and to Henry Davis, 
Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer for a lot of helpful discussion and feedback. 
Thanks also to the participants of Ling 720 at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst and to audiences at McGill University, UCLA, CUNY and SULA for 
useful comments. Fieldwork was supported in part by SSHRCC grant #410-
95-1519. 1 Thanks to Mike Terry for very helpful discussions about aspect in English. 
2 This definition of 'minimal situation' gives incorrect results for cases in 
which the eventualities are states or activities (see von Finte1 (1995)). We will 
adopt it here as a simplification . The reader is referred to Kratzer (1998b: 178) 
for a more accurate characterization in terms of 'exemplification'. 3 For reasons of space, we will not discuss this issue here. The reader is 
referred to the cited work for arguments, as well as Jelinek 1995, Jelinek and 
Demers 1994, Demirdache and Matthewson 1995. 
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